Introduction
Internet commerce requires secure communications. To order goods, a customer typically sends credit card details. To order life insurance, the customer might have to supply confidential personal data. Internet users would like to know that such information is safe from eavesdropping or tampering.
Many Web browsers protect transmissions using the protocol SSL (Secure Sockets Layer). The client and server machines exchange nonces and compute session keys from them. Version 3.0 of SSL has been designed to correct a flaw of previous versions, where an attacker could induce the parties into choosing an unnecessarily weak cryptosystem. The latest version of the protocol is called TLS (Transport Layer Security) [1] ; it closely resembles SSL 3.0.
Is TLS really secure? My proofs suggest that it is, but one should draw no conclusions without reading the rest of this report, which describes how the protocol was modelled and what properties were proved. I have analyzed a much simplified form of TLS; I assume hashing and encryption to be secure.
My abstract version of TLS is simpler than the concrete protocol, but it is still more complex than the protocols typically verified. We have not reached the limit of what can be analyzed formally. The proofs were conducted using Isabelle/HOL [4] , an interactive theorem prover for higher-order logic. They follow the inductive method [6] , which has a clear semantics and treats infinitestate systems. Model-checking is not used, so there are no restrictions on the agent population, numbers of concurrent runs, etc.
The paper gives an overview of TLS ( §2) and of the inductive method for verifying protocols ( §3). It continues by presenting the Isabelle formalization of TLS ( §4) and outlining some of the properties proved ( §5). Finally, the paper discusses related work ( §6) and concludes ( §7).
('Bob'), as is customary for authentication protocols, especially since C and S often have dedicated meanings in the literature.
At the start of a handshake, A contacts B, supplying a session identifier and nonce. In response, B sends another nonce and his public-key certificate (my model omits other possibilities). Then A generates a pre-master-secret, a 48-byte random string, and sends it to B encrypted with his public key. A optionally sends a signed message to authenticate herself. Now, both parties calculate the master-secret M from the nonces and the pre-master-secret, using a secure pseudo-random-number function (PRF). They calculate session keys from the nonces and M . Each session involves a pair of symmetric keys; A encrypts using one and B encrypts using the other. Before sending application data, both parties exchange finished messages to confirm all details of the handshake and to check that cleartext parts of messages have not been altered.
A full handshake is not always necessary. At some later time, A can resume a session by quoting an old session identifier along with a fresh nonce. If B is willing to resume the designated session, then he replies with a fresh nonce and both parties compute fresh session keys from these nonces and the stored master-secret, M . Both sides confirm this shorter run using finished messages.
My version of TLS leaves out details of record formats, cryptographic algorithms, etc.: they are irrelevant in an abstract analysis. Alert and failure messages are omitted: bad sessions are simply abandoned. I also omit the server key exchange message, which allows anonymous sessions.
Here are the handshake messages in detail, as I model them, along with comments about their relation to full TLS. Section numbers, such as tls §7.3, refer to the TLS specification [1] .
The items in this message include the nonce N a, called client random, and the session identifier Sid. Item P a is A's set of preferences for encryption and compression. For our purposes, all that matters is that both parties can detect if this value has been altered during transmission (tls §7.4.1.2). The server's public key, Kb, is delivered in a certificate signed by a trusted third party. (The TLS proposal (tls §7.4.2) specifies a chain of X.509v3 certificates, but I assume a single certification authority and omit lifetimes and similar details.) Making the certificate mandatory and eliminating the server key exchange message (tls §7.4.5) simplifies server hello. I leave certificate request (tls §7.4.4) implicit: A herself decides whether or not to send the optional mes- Once a party has received the other's finished message and compared it with her own, she is assured that both sides agree on all critical parameters, including M , P a and P b. Now she may begin sending confidential data. The SSL specification [2] erroneously states that she can send data immediately after sending her own finished message, before confirming these parameters. For session resumption, the hello messages are the same. After checking that the session identifier is recent enough, the parties exchange finished messages and start sending application data. On paper, session resumption does not involve new messages. But in the model, four further events are involved. Each party stores the session parameters after a successful handshake and looks them up when resuming a session.
Proving Protocols Using Isabelle
Isabelle [4] is an interactive theorem prover supporting several formalisms, one of which is higher-order logic (HOL). Protocols can be modelled in Isabelle/HOL as inductive definitions. Isabelle's simplifier and classical reasoner automate large parts of the proofs. A security protocol is modelled as the set of traces that could arise when a population of agents run it. Among the agents is a spy who controls some subset of them as well as the network itself. The population is infinite, and the number of interleaved sessions is unlimited. This section summarizes the approach, described in detail elsewhere [6] .
Message are composed of agent names, nonces, keys, etc.:
Three operators are used to express security properties. Each maps a set H of messages to another such set.
-parts H is the set of message components potentially recoverable from H.
-analz H is the set of message components recoverable from H by means of decryption using keys available (recursively) in analz H. -synth H is the set of messages that could be expressed, starting from H and guessable items, using hashing, encryption and concatenation.
Formalizing the Protocol in Isabelle
TLS uses both public-and shared-key encryption. Each agent A has a private key priK A and public key pubK A. The operators clientK and serverK create symmetric keys from a triple of nonces. Modelling the underlying pseudo-randomnumber generator causes some complications compared with the treatment of simple public-key protocols such as Needham-Schroeder [6] . The common properties of clientK and serverK are captured in the constant sessionK, which is assumed to be an injective source of session keys. Defining
ensures that the ranges of clientK and serverK are disjoint (there can be no collisions between the two).
Next come declarations of the constant tls to be a set of traces (lists of events) and of the pseudo-random function PRF. The latter has an elaborate definition in terms of the hash functions MD5 and SHA-1 (see tls §5). At the abstract level, we simply assume PRF to be injective. Figure 1 presents the first three rules, two of which are common to all protocols. Rule Nil allows the empty trace. Rule Fake says that the spy may invent messages using past traffic and send them to any other agent. A third rule, SpyKeys, augments Fake by letting the spy use the TLS-specific functions sessionK and PRF. In conjunction with the spy's other powers, it allows him to apply sessionK and PRF to any three nonces previously available to him. It does not let him invert these functions, which we assume to be one-way. We could replace SpyKeys by defining a TLS version of the function synth, but we should then have to rework the underlying theory of messages. Figure 2 presents three rules for the hello messages. Client hello lets any agent A send the nonce N a, session identifier Sid and preferences P a to any other agent, B. The assumptions Na ∈ used evsCH and Na ∈ range PRF state that N a is fresh and distinct from all possible master-secrets. The latter assumption precludes the possibility that A might choose a nonce identical to some mastersecret. (The standard function used does not cope with master-secrets because they never appear in traffic.) Both assumptions are reasonable because a 28-byte random string is highly unlikely to clash with any existing nonce or future master-secret.Server hello is modelled similarly. Its precondition is that B has received a suitable instance of Client hello.
The Certificate rule handles both server certificate and client certificate. Any agent may send his public-key certificate to any other agent. In the model, a certificate is simply an (agent, key) pair signed by the authentication server. Freshness of certificates and other details are not modelled.
The next two rules are client key exchange and certificate verify (Fig. 3) . Rule ClientKeyExch chooses a PMS that is fresh and differs from all mastersecrets, like the nonces in the hello messages. It requires server certificate to have been received. No agent is allowed to know the true sender of a message, so ClientKeyExch might deliver the PMS to the wrong agent. Similarly, CertVerify might use the Nb value from the wrong instance of server hello. Security is not compromised because the run will fail in the finished messages. ClientKeyExch not only sends the encrypted PMS to B but also stores it internally using the event Notes A {|B, PMS | }. Other rules model A's referring to this note. For instance, CertVerify states that if A chose PMS for B and has received a server hello message, then she may send certificate verify.
Next come the finished messages (Fig. 4) . ClientFinished states that if A has sent client hello and has received a plausible instance of server hello and has chosen a PMS for B, then she can calculate the master-secret and send a finished message using her client write key. ServerFinished is analogous and may occur if B has received a client hello, sent a server hello, and received a client key exchange message.
That covers all the protocol messages, but the specification is not complete. Four further rules (omitted here) model agents' confirmation of a session and a subsequent session resumption.
The final rule, Oops, models security breaches. Any session key, if used, may end up in the hands of the spy. Session resumption turns out to be safe even if the spy has obtained session keys from earlier sessions. 1. 'the peer's identity can be authenticated' 2. 'the negotiated secret is unavailable to eavesdroppers, and for any authenticated connection the secret cannot be obtained, even by an attacker who can place himself in the middle of the connection' 3. 'no attacker can modify the negotiation communication without being detected by the parties'
Basic Lemmas
In the inductive method, results are of three sorts: possibility properties, regularity lemmas and secrecy theorems. Possibility properties merely exercise all the rules to check that the model protocol can run. For a simple protocol, one possibility property suffices to show that message formats are compatible. For TLS, I proved four properties to check various paths through the main protocol, the client verify message, and session resumption. Regularity lemmas assert properties that hold of all traffic. Nobody sends messages to himself and no private keys become compromised in any protocol step. From our specification of TLS, it is easy to prove that all certificates are valid. If certificate(B, K) appears in traffic then K is B's public key:
[| certificate B KB ∈ parts(spies evs); evs ∈ tls |] =⇒ pubK B = KB This property is overly strong, but adding false certificates seems pointless, since B might be under the spy's control anyway.
Many regularity lemmas are technical. Here are two typical ones. If a mastersecret has appeared in traffic, then so has the underlying pre-master-secret. (Only the spy might send such a message.)
[| Nonce (PRF (PMS,NA,NB)) ∈ parts (spies evs); evs ∈ tls |] =⇒ Nonce PMS ∈ parts (spies evs)
If a pre-master-secret is fresh, then no session key derived from it can either have been transmitted or used to encrypt. Client authentication, one of the protocol's goals, is easily proved. If certificate verify has been sent, apparently by A, then it really has been sent by A provided A is uncompromised (not controlled by the spy). Moreover, A has chosen the pre-master-secret that is hashed in certificate verify.
[| X ∈ parts (spies evs); X = Crypt KA −1 (Hash{|nb, Agent B, pms|}); certificate A KA ∈ parts (spies evs); evs ∈ tls; A ∈ bad |] =⇒ Says A B X ∈ set evs
Secrecy Goals
Other protocol goals relate to secrecy. In the inductive method, secrecy theorems concern items that are available to some agents but not to others. Proving secrecy theorems seems always to require, as a lemma, some form of session key compromise theorem. Such theorems impose limits on the message components that can become compromised by the loss of a session key. For most protocols, we require that these components contain no session keys, but for TLS, what matters is that they contain no nonces. (Nonces are of critical importance because one of them is the pre-master-secret.) The theorem seems obvious; no honest agent encrypts nonces using session keys, and the spy can only send nonces that have already been compromised. However, its proof takes over 20 seconds to run. Such proofs typically involve large, though automatic, case analyses.
evs ∈ tls =⇒ Nonce N ∈ analz (insert (Key (sessionK z)) (spies evs)) = (Nonce N ∈ analz (spies evs))
Other secrecy proofs follow easily from the session key compromise theorem, using induction and simplification. If the master-secret is secure from the spy then so are all session keys derived from it, except those lost by the Oops rule. In fact, session keys do not form part of any traffic.
[| ∀ A. Says A Spy (Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),b))) ∈ set evs; Nonce M ∈ analz (spies evs); evs ∈ tls |] =⇒ Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),b)) ∈ parts (spies evs)
If A sends the client key exchange message to B, and both agents are uncompromised, then the pre-master-secret and master-secret will stay secret.
[| Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ tls; A ∈ bad; B ∈ bad |] =⇒ Nonce PMS ∈ analz (spies evs)
[| Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs; evs ∈ tls; A ∈ bad; B ∈ bad |] =⇒ Nonce (PRF(PMS,NA,NB)) ∈ analz (spies evs)
Finished Messages
The most important protocol goals concern authenticity of the finished message. If each party can know that the finished message just received indeed came from the expected agent, then they can compare the message components to confirm that no tampering has occurred. Naturally, these guarantees are conditional on both agents' being uncompromised.
The client's guarantee states that if A has chosen a pre-master-secret PMS for B and if any finished message is present that has been encrypted with a server write key derived from PMS , and if B has not given that session key to the spy (via Oops), then B himself has sent that message, and to A.
The server's guarantee is slightly different. If any message has been encrypted with a client write key derived from a given PMS -which we assume to have come from A-and if A has not given that session key to the spy, then A herself sent that message, and to B.
[| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);
Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y ∈ parts (spies evs); Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs; Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,M))) ∈ set evs; evs ∈ tls; A ∈ bad; B ∈ bad |] =⇒ Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) ∈ set evs
The assumption (involving Notes) that A chose the PMS is essential. If A has not authenticated herself, then B must simply trust that she is present. By sending certificate verify, A can discharge this assumption:
[| Crypt KA −1 (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}) ∈ parts (spies evs); certificate A KA ∈ parts (spies evs); evs ∈ tls; A ∈ bad |] =⇒ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} ∈ set evs B's guarantee does not even require his inspecting the finished message. The very use of clientK(Na,Nb,M) is proof that the communication is from A to B. If we consider the analogous property for A, we find that using serverK(Na,Nb,M) only guarantees that the sender is B; in the absence of certificate verify, B has no evidence that the PMS came from A. If he sends server finished to somebody else then the session will fail, so there is no security breach. Still, changing client key exchange to include A's identity,
would slightly strengthen the protocol and simplify the analysis. The guarantees for finished messages apply to session resumption as well as to full handshakes. The inductive proofs cover all the rules that make up the definition of the constant tls, including those that model resumption.
Related Work
Wagner and Schneier [7] analyze SSL 3.0 in detail. Their form of scrutiny, particularly concerning attacks against the underlying cryptosystems, will remain an essential complement to proving protocols at the abstract level.
In his PhD thesis, Sven Dietrich analyses SSL 3.0 using the belief logic NCP (non-monotonic cryptographic protocols). Recall that SSL allows both authenticated and unauthenticated sessions; Dietrich considers the latter and shows them to be secure against a passive eavesdropper. Although NCP is a formal logic, Dietrich appears to have generated his lengthy derivations by hand.
Mitchell et al. [3] apply model checking to a number of simple protocols derived from SSL 3.0. Most of the protocols are badly flawed (no nonces, for example) and the model checker finds many attacks.
Conclusions
The inductive method has many advantages. Its semantic framework, based on the actions agents can perform, has few of the peculiarities of belief logics. Proofs impose no limits on the number of simultaneous or resumed sessions. Isabelle's automatic tools allow the proofs to be generated with a moderate effort, and they run fast. The full TLS proof script runs in a few minutes.
I obtained the abstract message exchange given in §2 by reverse engineering the TLS specification. This process took about two weeks, one-third of the time spent on this verification. SSL must have originated in such a message exchange, but I could not find one in the literature. If security protocols are to be trusted, their design process must be transparent. The underlying abstract protocol should be exposed to public scrutiny. The concrete protocol should be presented as a faithful realization of the abstract one. Designers should distinguish between attacks against the abstract message exchange and those against the concrete protocol.
All the expected security goals were proved: no attacks turned up. This unexciting outcome might be expected in a protocol already so thoroughly examined. No unusual lines of reasoning were required, unlike the case of the Yahalom protocol [5] . The proofs did yield some insights into TLS, such as the possibility of strengthening client key exchange by including A's identity ( §5). The main interest of this work lies in the modelling of TLS, especially its use of pseudorandom number generators.
In several places, the protocol requires computing the hash of 'all previous handshake messages. ' There is obviously much redundancy, and the requirement is ambiguous too; the specification is sprinkled with remarks that certain routine messages or components should not be hashed. One such message, change cipher spec, was thereby omitted and later turned out to be essential [7] . I suggest, therefore, that hashes should be computed not over everything but over selected items that the protocol designer requires to be confirmed. An inductive analysis can help in selecting the critical message components. The TLS security analysis (tls §F.1.1.2) states that the critical components of the hash in certificate verify are the server's name and nonce, but my proofs suggest that the pre-master-secret is also necessary.
Once session keys have been established, the parties have a secure channel upon which they must run a reliable communication protocol. Abadi tells me that the part of TLS concerned with communication should also be verified, since this aspect of SSL once contained errors. I have considered only the security aspects of TLS. The communication protocol could be verified separately, assuming an unreliable medium rather than an enemy. My proofs assume that application data does not contain secrets associated with TLS sessions, such as keys and master-secrets; if it does, then one security breach could lead to many others.
